Security¶
NativeHTMLKit runs no JavaScript and loads no remote content over HTTP, so classic web XSS cannot execute code. Markup injection still matters: untrusted text interpreted as HTML can rearrange your UI, spoof controls or hide information. Treat the page like any other UI that shows untrusted data.
Text is safe, markup is trusted¶
| Safe for any string | Parses HTML: trusted input only |
|---|---|
set_text, set_value, Node.set_text, append_text, batch set_text, set_attribute values |
replace_html, insert_html, Node.insert_html/replace_html, batch insert_html/replace_children_html, load_html |
Escape every untrusted value you put into markup, including attribute values:
import html
row = (f'<li id="file-{index}" title="{html.escape(path_text)}">'
f'{html.escape(file_name)}</li>')
document.insert_html("files", row)
html.escape escapes &, <, >, " and ' (with the default quote=True), which covers text
and quoted attribute values. Never put untrusted data into element ids, tag names, unquoted
attributes, style or CSS: build those from your own values (numbers, known keys) and map them
back in Python, as the examples do with id="todo-7-delete".
Untrusted text includes user input, file names and contents, clipboard text, network data, command-line arguments and anything read back from the document.
Trusted HTML and CSS¶
Markup and styles you ship with the application are trusted. Load them from your package
(load_file) or constants. Do not load HTML files chosen by the user as documents; show their text
with set_value/set_text instead.
add_stylesheet and register_resources take trusted content too; never build CSS from untrusted
strings.
Links and external targets¶
Documents never navigate; a link activation only sends link_activated to Python. Decide
explicitly what to open, and check the scheme yourself before calling open_external:
def on_link(event):
url = event.get("url") or ""
if url.startswith(("https://", "mailto:")):
app.open_external(url, window=window)
The host itself refuses schemes other than http, https, mailto and file (and executable
files on Windows).
Files¶
- Paths from dialogs and forms are chosen by the user, but their content is still untrusted: limit sizes, decode explicitly, handle errors.
- Write application data atomically into the per-application directories (
desktop.paths).
Process and credentials¶
- The host connection is a private local endpoint (a Unix socket in a 0700 runtime directory, or a
named pipe restricted to the current logon session) and requires a single-use launch token. The
SDK removes the token from
os.environwhen it connects, so child processes you start do not inherit it. - Diagnostics never record payloads or form values.
--host-log/NATIVEHTMLKIT_HOST_LOGwrites raw host records that include your application's output: treat those files as sensitive. NATIVEHTMLKIT_HOST_BINARYruns an unverified host; use it only for development. The bundled host is checked against its pinned SHA-256 on every launch.
Source: nativehtmlkit-python/docs/guides/security.md ยท edit the page there.